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ABSTRACT
Scholars of presidential primaries have long posited a dynamic positive
feedback loop between fundraising and electoral success. Yet exist-
ing work on both directions of this feedback remains inconclusive
and is often explicitly cross-sectional, ignoring the dynamic aspect
of the hypothesis. Pairing high-frequency FEC data on contributions
and expenditures with Iowa Electronic Markets data on perceived
probability of victory, we examine the bidirectional feedback between
contributions and viability. We find robust, significant positive feedback
in both directions. This might suggest multiple equilibria: a candidate
initially anointed as the front-runner able to sustain such status solely
by the fundraising advantage conferred despite possessing no advantage
in quality. However, simulations suggest the feedback loop cannot,
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by itself, sustain advantage. Given the observed durability of
front-runners, it would thus seem there is either some other feedback at
work and/or the process by which the initial front-runner is identified
is informative of candidate quality.
Keywords: Campaign finance; vicious cycle; Presidential primary;
fund-raising
JEL Codes: D72
1 Which Came First: The Money or the Voters?
The conventional wisdom among campaign managers and the popular press
is that money in politics is a vicious cycle. Candidates need to raise money
to prove they are viable; and they need to be viable candidates to effectively
raise money. In September 2007, Newsweek reported that former Arkansas
Governor and Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee seemed to
be a perfect fit for the GOP base. However, the article continued, ‘‘Huck-
abee is stuck in a familiar political trap: is he having trouble raising money
because no one thinks he can win, or does no one think he can win because
he’s having trouble raising money?’’1
Logically, this is the classic chicken-and-egg quandary. If such a positive-
feedback loop exists, it carries at least two important implications for our
system of representation and public choice. First, the positive question: how
are the initial front-runners — who are then favored to become the nominees
via the reinforcement process at work — selected? And second, the norma-
tive question: is the selection method desirable in the sense of selecting the
best representative for the electorate? But it remains to be established that
the conventional wisdom is correct; that positive-feedback between fundrais-
ing and viability exists in both directions and is of sufficient strength to
constitute a vicious cycle. As we will discuss in the next section, earlier work
has not been conclusive. In this paper, we document the existence of this
feedback loop in US Presidential primaries but show that it is too weak to
constitute a sole explanation for the observed durability of the front-runner.
Our investigation consists of three complimentary empirical exercises
followed by simulations. The first exercise estimates an ARIMA model for
1 Holly Bailey, “Perfect Stranger,” Newsweek, September 3, 2007.
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campaign fundraising, including Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) prices as an
independent variable to capture the possibility of feedback from perceived
chance of victory to fundraising success. The results clearly show that
candidates’ receipts respond to changes in their electoral fortunes with
magnitudes that are both economically and statistically significant. In fact,
increases in IEM price have an increasing marginal effect on campaign
finances until a candidate is the established front-runner. Our second analy-
sis shows that a candidate appearance increases local receipts, and, crucially,
that this increase is larger when the candidate is doing well in the IEM
markets. This further suggests that fundraising is subject to bandwagoning.
Finally, turning to the other direction of the feedback loop, we conduct a
panel analysis of the effects of spending on vote share during the campaign.
Because we have panel data, we can use fixed-effects to control for omitted
candidate-specific effects without having to limit our sample of candidates
and thus without fear of selection limiting out-of-sample prediction. We
find that IEM share price responds strongly to changes in both one’s own
spending and the spending of one’s opponents, but that there are decreas-
ing returns to these effects, as expected. Having established the existence of
both directions of the feedback loop, we then conduct calibrated simulations
to illustrate the strength of the feedback loop under conditions approximat-
ing Presidential primaries. We look at whether the vicious cycle can sustain
a front-runner advantage gifted to one of two equal candidates. We find that
the feedback loop is not strong enough to constitute a sole explanation for
the phenomenon of interest. The durability of front-runner advantage must
rest on more than the fund-raising advantage provided by this status.
The common thread is the dynamic nature of our study. We analyze both
directions of the feedback loop with a consistent set of elections, a consistent
source of data, and a dynamic framework thus enabling us to evaluate the
causal system.
2 Unraveling the Causal Knot: Past Work on the Connection
between Money and Electoral Success2
Ever since the McGovern–Fraser reforms opened the delegate-selection
process to ordinary voters thus requiring candidates to raise money and
2 There exists a well developed literature modeling the transmission of information in sequential
voting contests such as Presidential primaries (Dekel and Piccione, 2000; Klumpp and Polborn,
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campaign broadly to garner widespread attention, scholars have puzzled
over the workings of the modern Presidential nomination process. Many
of the salient questions are explicitly dynamic. What explains the durabil-
ity of front-runners (Mayer, 2003)? How does a foremost challenger emerge
from the pack (Bartels, 1988)? What role does the sequencing and spac-
ing of the primaries play (Mayer and Busch, 2004)? When do candidates
choose to withdraw (Norrander, 2000, 2006)? Other critical issues such as
the proper regulation of campaign finance and the relative importance of
ordinary citizens vs. party elites in selecting the nominee also depend on an
understanding of campaign dynamics.
As the article on Huckabee’s plight suggests, candidates, media, and the
public frequently assert that money drives all. Certainly, candidates must
raise money to support a campaign that can both determine what the elec-
torate wants and reach them to demonstrate the candidate can meet those
demands (Brown, et al. 1995). Indeed, prominent academic models of pres-
idential primaries suggest that the final delegate shares of the candidates
can be predicted using only the polls and the cash-on-hand at the end of
the primary season (Mayer, 1996; Steger, 2000; Adkins and Dowdle, 2000).
But such models are cross-sectional rather than dynamic, drawing only on
the candidates’ relative positions at the end of the invisible primary without
explaining the dynamics that led to those positions.3
In addition to fundraising, two other independent factors have received
scholarly attention. A number of authors, including Bartels (1988), Mutz
2006; Ali and Kartik, 2008; Callander, 2007; Knight and Schiff, 2010). These models postulate
that candidates are differentiated by a hidden valence characteristic that voters wish to discover
so as to choose correctly. Voters receive noisy signals — either exogenously, or by paying a
cost of discovery, or via campaign efforts — of this candidate quality. Voters in later primaries
may observe the results of early primaries and use the information to update their priors
about candidate quality. The literature is concerned with whether sequential voting leads to
more efficient discovery and aggregation of information and thence to more efficient candidate
selection. Later voters may benefit from additional information beyond that which would be
available was voting to take place simultaneously. Or later voters may choose to free-ride and
simply “bandwagon” rather than acquiring and acting on their own information. While this is
an elegant and interesting literature, it has thus far not touched on fundraising and campaign
expenditures as a channel of feedback. As such, it is understandably mute on our subject of
interest, the money primary taking place before any votes are cast.
3 Intriguingly, Adkins and Dowdle (2005) use the same variables from the beginning of the invis-
ible primary and argue that there is little loss in predictive power, suggesting that very little
is revealed or determined during the invisible primary. This concurs with recent scholarship
emphasizing the durability of front-runner advantage (2008 notwithstanding). But this only
makes it more important to understand the dynamics of the invisible primary to understand
why front-runner advantage is so durable.
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(1995a,b), Damore (1997), and Steger (2000) have emphasized media
coverage — both the amount and the slant — and have looked at the sources
and effects of such coverage. Steger (2000) and Cohen et al. (2008) both
emphasize the importance of endorsements by party elites. Clearly there is
interplay between each of the intermediate measures of success: fundraising
enables spending which begets media attention and voter support; fundrais-
ing, media attention, and voter support may signal viability and thereby
garner endorsements by party elites; endorsements lead to voter approval
both directly, by serving as a trusted seal of approval, and indirectly, by plac-
ing fundraising networks and skilled operatives at the candidate’s disposal.
To a large extent, understanding the nomination process is to under-
stand the interplay between insider endorsements, free-media, poll standing,
and fundraising. Indeed, Steger notes “A major question for future research
involves unraveling the causal arrows between these factors [endorsements,
money, and poll support]. Do candidates like Bob Dole receive more endorse-
ments because they have higher polling numbers and more money, or do
the endorsements come first? . . . Future research will need to focus more
on the temporal sequencing between endorsements and fund-raising, media-
coverage, and poll position.” (Steger, 2000; p. 17 quoted in Cohen et al.,
2008; pp. 282–283.) Nonetheless, over a decade later there remains rela-
tively little formal empirical work measuring these causal relationships as a
dynamic system.
By collecting data on endorsements, and media coverage as well as
fundraising and poll standing, Cohen et al. make the most complete effort
towards quantifying the interplay between each of the aspects of the system.
Unfortunately, measuring all four factors comes at a cost. Their empirical
work is low frequency, comparing only two points in the invisible primary,
which necessarily limits their conclusions. Perhaps as a result, they find an
especially small role for money, noting that it ‘‘stands out for its relative
lack of connection to everything else.’’ (Cohen et al., p. 264) By contrast, we
find that money is not only very strongly determined by perceived viability,
but in turn has a significant effect on perceived viability. Nonetheless, their
approach represents an advance over previous investigations which have typ-
ically considered one of the causal arrows in isolation and are often solely
cross-sectional.
Our paper constitutes the first analysis of the interplay between pri-
mary factors in a high-frequency analysis. Specifically, we use daily data
on fundraising and the estimated probability of a candidate capturing the
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nomination. The former is measured by the FEC, the latter by the IEM. We
do not separately include endorsements and free media attention because we
do not have daily data on these factors and we wish to maintain the high-
frequency analysis. Instead, we can think of the IEM price as simultaneously
capturing a mix of three fundamental factors: voter approval, elite endorse-
ments, and media attention. We refer to this catchall market-assessment
as viability. Given our focus on a two-variable system — fundraising and
viability — we pay special attention to the prior literature on the deter-
minants and effectiveness of fundraising. While the simultaneous causation
between money and other measures of electoral success is widely recognized,
in general each causal direction has been investigated separately.
2.1 Can Elections be Bought?
Springing from the seminal paper by Jacobson (1978), one literature asks
whether candidates who raise more money garner more votes. Rather
than as a phenomenon of interest in itself, this literature has approached
simultaneity as an econometric obstacle to correctly estimating the effect of
spending on vote-share. The baseline econometric method involves a cross-
sectional regression of vote shares on the end-of-campaign spending totals
of the challenger and the incumbent in US Congressional elections.4 The
literature can be read as a series of refinements of Jacobson’s original mea-
surement and estimation techniques to address the econometric concern.
Green and Krasno (1988) instrument for incumbent spending and control
for challenger quality (wealth, previous office, etc.). Gerber (1998) instru-
ments for challenger as well as incumbent spending. Erikson and Palfrey
(1998) estimate a system of three equations for incumbent spending, chal-
lenger spending, and vote share. Taking a different approach, Levitt (1994)
addresses all candidate-specific omitted factors (e.g., candidate quality) by
considering only races with repeat challengers and taking the first difference
between the first and second runs of the same matchup. Erikson and Palfrey
(2000) argue that the simultaneity problem can be solved by looking only
4 While the effect of spending in a Presidential primary, the parameter of interest in this paper,
has received less attention in the literature, we feel the underlying dynamics must be similar in
any mass election: candidates must mobilize endorsements from key elites and interests, must
compete for favorable free media coverage, and must raise money to pay for campaigning and
mass media to reach voters. At the same time, the analyst faces many of the same economet-
rics challenges in both cases. Hence we feel this literature, while focused predominantly on
Congressional races, remains relevant.
The Vicious Cycle 7
at close races. Other papers are dedicated to controlling for variation in
the productivity of spending from other omitted variables such as differen-
tial effectiveness of spending. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) use a more precise
measure of spending based on communication with voters rather than raw
expenditures. Stratmann (2007) corrects for the difference in the price of
purchasing advertising in different TV markets so as to achieve a measure
of effective spending. Each econometric approach admits a slightly different
sample and delivers a different estimate of coefficient magnitudes.5
Naturally, uncertainty over the proper econometric method translates into
uncertainty over the magnitude of this cross-sectional effect and consider-
able disagreement about how to read the pattern of results. Given his own
results, Levitt (1994) understandably concludes that the marginal produc-
tivity of spending is trivial; previously estimated magnitudes are inflated
due to omitted variables bias. Nonetheless, this is a troubling conclusion
in that it implies that candidates — all of whom spend enormous effort to
raise and spend money — grossly misunderstand campaign dynamics. Strat-
mann (2005) expresses the central paradox. ‘‘While incumbents and chal-
lengers spend much time on fund-raising and appear to believe that money is
an important ingredient for winning elections, academic researchers for the
most part have trouble establishing a causal and quantitatively important
connection between spending and vote shares.’’
We feel that Jacobson’s (1978) original viewpoint fits the evidence quite
well. Campaign spending serves primarily to familiarize voters with a can-
didate’s brand. As such, it is subject to diminishing returns due to satura-
tion. Thus, incumbents, who begin a campaign with an established brand,
receive less bang-for-their-buck than challengers (Jacobson, 1978; Green and
Krasno, 1988; Gerber, 1998) and senior incumbents receive less bang-for-
their-buck than junior incumbents (Erickson and Palfrey, 1998). Levitt’s
seemingly puzzling finding that both incumbent and challenger spending are
extremely ineffective is simply a function of the sample that his econometric
method selects. If candidates use spending to build a brand, it is likely in
these cases of repeat challenges when spending matters least as both candi-
dates have already built brand recognition. We feel the range of estimates
may be most usefully interpreted as estimates of the declining marginal pro-
ductivity of candidate spending as a candidate’s name recognition improves.
5 See Gerber (2004) for a swift summary of the development of econometric approaches in this
literature.
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Nonetheless, the econometric approach of this literature is static and thus
unable to address the issue of positive feedback during a campaign. A posi-
tive correlation between money spent and votes garnered, even if it is causal,
is consistent with, but does not necessarily imply, the kind of vicious cycle
that constitutes Huckabee’s ‘‘familiar political trap.’’ Demonstration of the
vicious cycle requires testing the dynamic feedback rather than simply look-
ing at the end-of-campaign totals.
2.2 Who Gives How Much to Whom? And Why?
The literature on the determinants of campaign contributions is also well-
developed, though the role of a candidate’s electoral prospects — the crucial
point for the issue at hand — is less consistently considered. In Presidential
primaries, small individual contributions, rather than PAC money, are the
average and the marginal contribution and constitute the bulk of money
raised by candidates (Norrander, 1996; Francia et al., 1999; Ansolabehere
et al., 2003). When considering the motive of the giver, these contributions
should be seen as consumption — a desire to participate in the campaign
and associate with the others doing so — rather than investment — an
attempt to influence future policy (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Verba et al.,
1995).6 While contributors do care about the policy position of the candi-
date, they are often motivated even more strongly by personal connections
and the excitement of participating in the campaign (Brown et al., 1995).
In sum, candidates must work primarily to attract individual contributions
and they must do so by offering an attractive package of associative benefits.
Because potential contributors find greater value in associating with success-
ful campaigns, the possibility exists for strong momentum effects whereby
a campaign enjoying good news and favorable prospects attracts a greater
flow of donations.
Unfortunately, the two most explicitly dynamic empirical studies of the
fund-raising process in Presidential primaries come to opposite conclu-
sions regarding the momentum hypothesis. Damore (1997) finds that elec-
toral success in primary contests has a huge impact on the fund-raising
of long-shot candidates (though an insignificant effect on the finances of
6 Concerning Congressional races, there is some debate about whether PAC money affects rep-
resentatives’ votes (Stratmann, 1991, 1998, 2002, 2005) or simply serves to elect politicians
who are already like-minded (Bronars and Lott, 1997; Ansolabehere et al., 2003). For the
presidential primaries we study, PAC money is far less important.
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established candidates). On the other hand, Hinckley and Green (1996) fit
an ARIMA process to each candidate’s fundraising and include measures
of both campaign events and standing in the polls. They conclude that
newsworthy events have little effect on fundraising and see no evidence of
momentum.
Other studies are similarly split on the strength of this feedback loop.
Hagen and Mayer (2000), Ansolabehere et al. (2003) and Verba et al. (1995)
stress that widespread recognition, positive public image, and explicit cam-
paign successes increase willingness to contribute. However, Goff (2004)
rebuffs the concept of momentum finance in modern Presidential primaries:
‘‘[candidates] relying upon their success in these open contests to generate
additional support for the ensuing contests inevitably will be disappointed
as their campaigns are overwhelmed by competing candidates who have
entered the formal nomination process financially prepared.’’ The essential
question — whether feedback from campaign conditions to fund-raising is
strong enough to contribute to the hypothesized vicious cycle — remains an
open question.
3 Data: sources and description
3.1 Campaign Contributions
We use data on campaign contributions from the Federal Elections Com-
mission (FEC).7 For each contribution made by any individual or PAC to a
political campaign, the dataset records the date, donor’s address and occu-
pation, and the amount. The information is compiled by candidates and their
campaigns and submitted to the FEC quarterly in the year before a general
election and monthly in the year of the general election. The FEC requires
candidates, parties, and PACs to document only donations from individuals
or organizations who cumulatively give $200 or more. This means donations
of less than $200 are not part of our dataset and constitute an important
potential source of measurement error.8
We have aggregated the contributions by candidate so that we have con-
tribution schedules including the total number and amount of contribu-
tions for each candidate during each day of the campaign. The relevant
7 Data are available at http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.
8 Though unrecorded by the FEC, campaigns keep track of these smaller donations so that they
can report total fundraising numbers each quarter.
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Figure 1. Log of total daily contributions 2008, Democratic presidential
primary.
histograms show the series is distributed approximately log-normally9 so we
use a log-transformation. The logged contributions data display seasonality
along three dimensions. We have presented data from the 2008 democratic
presidential primary to illustrate these patterns in Figure 1. First, there is
a clear day-of-the-week effect: candidates raise significantly fewer donations
on weekends, with Sundays being even lighter than Saturdays. Mondays
tend to be somewhat lighter than Tuesday through Friday, which are statis-
tically indistinguishable from each other. Second, there is a strong quarterly
seasonality, with fundraising tending to increase as the quarter progresses.
Finally, there is a large spike on the final day of each quarter. The spike is less
severe for earlier campaigns and seems to affect only the contributions from
individuals to campaigns, not the data for PACs. Discussions with politi-
cal insiders have led us to a potential explanation for this spike. To begin
with, campaign staffers do not specialize: the staffers making calls soliciting
9 There is a slight left skewness due to the low totals on weekends.
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donations are also responsible for filing reports with the FEC. These reports,
submitted quarterly, are due 10 days after the end of the reporting period.
It seems that early in the quarter, staffers both solicit and log donations.
However, as the quarter comes to a close, resources are shifted to solicitation
because there is a drive to report as large a quarterly number as possible.
When the quarter ends, resources are moved back to logging donations and,
as a result, campaigns may record most checks that have come in the past
weeks as coming in on the final day of the quarter. It has also been sug-
gested that staff workers, during solicitation calls, stress the last day of the
quarter to potential donors, which may lead donors to date their checks for
this day. The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the
log-transformed series indicate that, once seasonality has been removed, the
data are best modeled as an ARIMA(1,0,1) process.10
3.2 Campaign Expenditures
The FEC also collects budget statements from the candidates (and other
political organizations) on a regular basis.11 The statements, which are
reported quarterly in the year before the general election and monthly in
the year of, detail campaign expenses and receipts. Spending is nominally
broken down into four broad categories: operating expenditures, fundrais-
ing disbursements, legal/accounting disbursements, and other expenses. The
receipt information includes totals of contributions from individuals and
PACs, as well as loans from the candidate, transfers from previous cam-
paigns, and federal matching funds.
There are two main issues with this data. First, it is of much lower fre-
quency. In order to obtain a consistent frequency, the monthly data from
the year of the general election must be aggregated to the quarterly level
and, because most primary contests in our sample are decided by late March
or early April, there are at most five quarterly data points per candidate.
Second, the reported composition of expenditures is clearly untrustworthy.
According to data provided to the FEC in 2004, President George Bush’s
10 Hinkley and Green (1996) chose to aggregate the FEC data to a weekly time series so as to
avoid day-of-the-week effects. We choose to remain at the daily level because we are mindful of
Rossana and Seater’s (1995) finding that “temporal aggregation systematically alters the time
series properties of the data so that even the [low frequency] variation in the underlying data
is totally lost. Moreover, the aggregated data have excessive long-term persistence” (p. 450).
Luckily, day-of-the-week effects can be stripped with dummy variables.
11 Data are available at http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/pres cf/pres cf.shtml.
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re-election campaign did not spend a single dollar on fundraising expenses,
despite raising a record $258 million. Similarly, his Democratic challenger,
Senator John Kerry reported spending only $1.6 million on fundraising, all
before October 2003. Most campaigns in our sample report spending the vast
majority of their funds on operating expenses. While it is not clear whether
this is a deliberate obfuscation by campaigns seeking to conceal their budget
decisions or merely oversimplified accounting, it means that only the total
expenditure figures are usable.
3.3 Likelihood of Victory
To measure the probability of victory, we use share prices on winner-take-all
contracts traded on the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM). There is by now a
large literature discussing the IEM’s protocols (Forsythe et al., 1999; Berg
et al., 2000) and establishing its efficiency (Rhode and Strumpf, 2007; Oliven
and Reitz, 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2007). There are a number of reasons
why prediction market data work better than polling data for our project.
To begin with, the frequency is much greater. While some polls are taken
daily close to election day, it is difficult to find such high-frequency polls
more than a year before the nominating convention, especially for earlier
primaries. In addition, the question answered explicitly by those polled and
the one answered implicitly by IEM participants are different. As Berg et al.
(2000) note, the Iowa Markets (and other electronic markets) ask traders
whom they think will win. Polls ask whom the subject personally supports.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) argue that market prices on winner-take-all
contracts on prediction markets represent probabilities of victory. Given this
assumption, the prediction markets provide precisely the required data for
this project whereas poll data would be an imperfect substitute requiring a
difficult translation.12 But it is not simply a measure of convenience. Given
that the general public does not closely follow the primary until much later,
using the IEM as a market calculator of political enthusiasts processing
all available information, including that which will garner public attention
only later and/or indirectly, gives us a better window into viability than
would polls. While prediction markets may be less accurate than the proper
sophisticated reading of the polls (Erikson and Wlezien, 2008), they are con-
siderably more accurate than a na¨ıve reading of the polls (Berg et al., 2000).
12 See Erikson and Wliezen (2008) or Nate Silver’s work, www.fivethirtyeight.com, to see exactly
how complex this translation can be.
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In sum, IEM prices constitute a high quality, easily interpreted measure
which is consistently available throughout our sample.
We use data from six presidential nomination contests: the Republican
primaries of 1996, 2000, and 2008 and the Democratic primaries of 2000,
2004, and 2008.13 Contracts were also traded on a handful of candidates
who never entered the race (e.g., Colin Powell in 1996 or Hilary Clinton in
2004). As these candidates never reported contributions to the FEC, they
do not enter our sample. We are left with 26 candidates. We follow each
candidate from the beginning of their listing on the IEM until they drop out
of the race. To avoid including the dead period during which the presumptive
victor prepares for the general election, we cut the victor’s sample at the
point at which the last challenger has dropped out.
Not surprisingly, as they are asset prices, daily IEM data follow a near
random walk (ARIMA(0,1,0)).14,15 The presence of a unit root cannot be
rejected at the 10% level for 20 of the 26 candidates and the estimated
autoregressive coefficient is in excess of 0.98 for 20 of the 26 candidates. The
series also exhibit non-stationary variance. In general, prices from the period
before the Iowa Caucus display a much higher variance than prices during
the voting season.16 Box–Cox estimation shows that a log-transformation of
these prices stabilizes the variance for most candidates.17
In addition to the winner-take-all contracts, we make use of a number of
complementary securities traded on the IEM. As we will explain later, we
use these to control for party-level momentum. These series are drawn from
various IEM contracts such as the probability that a Republican wins the
White House (1996, 2008) or the probability that Republicans win control
of the House of Representatives (2000).
13 IEM data on the Democratic campaign of 1992 begins too late in the primary season for our
purposes.
14 However, Ljung–Box statistics show the autocorrelations are highly significant at certain lags
for several candidates. Investigation shows this to be due to extremely large shocks from the
first few primaries. These outlying shocks then drive a few autocorrelations at lag lengths
chosen randomly by the electoral calendar. As such, the autocorrelations are not a persistent
feature of the data generating process. ARIMA(0,1,0) remains the best characterization of the
underlying process.
15 The IEM score of any given candidates will evolve during the campaign from some intermediate
starting value to either 0 (loser) or 1 (winner). Thus the ex-post existence of a single winner
and multiple losers generates the appearance of a trend despite the underlying random walk.
16 This variance echoes the findings for poll data of Erikson and Wlezien (2008). Their results
show that the variance in primary season polling data is much lower once voting begins and
that variance declines in general as the election date approaches.
17 Not all series were stabilized by the log transformation but in the interest of cross-estimation
comparison we standardize this transformation.
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3.4 Candidate Appearances
The final dataset of which we make use is a list of appearances for each
candidate during the 2008 Republican and Democratic primaries. This data
was collected by the Washington Post and displayed on their website during
the campaign. An entry lists the candidate, location (city and state), and
date, and frequently includes time of day and often the type of event (e.g.,
fundraiser, house party, speech, debate). Across both the primary and the
general election, the dataset includes 7234 events for 17 candidates. The
Washington Post describes their data as follows:
washingtonpost.com’s Presidential Campaign Tracker uses infor-
mation from campaigns, media reports and other sources to com-
pile a listing of events involving presidential candidates and their
spouses. The tracker covers events since January 2007. It does
not include every event — particularly fundraisers, which often
are unannounced. Some events will be added retroactively as
more details become available
As they are careful to point out, it is an incomplete list. Nonetheless, it
represents a thorough compiling of available public information. In prepara-
tion for the analysis in the section on productivity of campaign expenditures,
we restrict to just the primary season and count multiple events on the same
day only once, reducing the dataset to 2559 entries.18
4 The Battle for the Bucks
Our first goal is to analyze the determinants of campaign contributions.
Given our focus on a possible feedback loop, we are particularly interested
in the effect of perceived electoral viability on a candidate’s ability to elicit
contributions. At the same time, our review of the literature suggests two
additional variables of interest. First, whether the general political climate is
favorable to a candidate’s party may enter the strategic calculus of a poten-
tial donor for many of the same reasons as those pertaining to the particular
fortunes of the candidate in question. Namely, the likelihood of a candidate
capturing the White House depends not only on his or her ability to capture
18 Two appearances by the same candidate on the same day in different states are treated as two
appearances, one in each state.
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the nomination but also to succeed in the general election. Furthermore, the
psychological associative benefits likely depend on the broader popularity of
the party. Second, because it takes time to develop the fund-raising networks
and because voters and contributors increasingly tune in to the campaign as
the convention approaches, there is a natural growth in funds raised, inde-
pendent of the aforementioned factors. Hence we include a control for the
number of days until the appropriate party convention.
We have run both a pooled sample with candidate fixed-effects and sepa-
rate regressions for each candidate in each year’s nomination process. Each
of these regressions shares a common specification:
(1 − ϕ1L)Ct = β1Vt−1 + β2Pt−1 + β3Dt−1
+
K∑
k=1
αk(Vt−k − Vt−k−1) + Γ′S + εt (1)
L is the lag operator so the models are estimated with an AR(1) term for
the dependent variable (C, the natural log of weekly contributions from
individuals) and the one-day lag of three independent variables: the natural
log of the probability of victory (V ), the control for party popularity (P ),
and days until the convention (D). For reasons explained below, we also
include K = 7 lags of the change in the natural log of the probability of
victory. The error term, εt, is MA(1). Finally, we add a vector S of dummy
variables for the day of the week, week of the quarter, and the last day of the
quarter to capture the seasonalities discussed in the previous section. For
each candidate, the sample period begins with the opening of the nomination
contract on the IEM (see Table 1) and ends with the formal announcement
of withdrawal by the candidate. For the eventual winner, we end the sample
on the date of withdrawal of the last competitor listed on the IEM so as to
avoid including the dead period between the practical end of the primary
and the formal nomination at the convention.
The foremost concern with estimating Equation (1) is possible measure-
ment error in the dating of contributions. Ideally, we would regress each
contribution on the political conditions prevailing at the time the contrib-
utor made the decision to contribute. But there are several sources of lag
between the date at which the contributor decided to contribute and the date
reported by the campaign to the FEC for that contribution. The first is the
delay between when the contributor makes the decision to contribute and
when the decision is implemented by writing and mailing the check. This may
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Table 1. Iowa electronic markets winner-take-all contracts.
Market Start date Last drop-out Contracts
RNC ’96 Jan 5, 1994 Mar 26, 1996 Alexander, Buchanan, B. Dole,
Forbes, and Gramm
DNC ’00 Jun 14, 1999 Mar 10, 2000 Bradley and Gore
RNC ’00 Jun 14, 1999 Mar 10, 2000 Bush, E. Dole, Forbes, McCain,
and Quayle
DNC ’04 Feb 20, 2003 Mar 4, 2004 Clark, Dean, Edwards,
Gephardt, Kerry, and
Lieberman
DNC ’08 Mar 2, 2007 Jun 5, 2008 H. Clinton, Edwards, and
Obama
RNC ’08 Mar 2, 2007 Mar 6, 2008 Giuliani, Huckabee, McCain,
Romney, and F. Thompson
include delays in the contributor’s own information set (i.e., contributors lag
the IEM traders in keeping up with the news). The second is due to deliv-
ery via post office, in person, or electronic. The third is the delay between
receipt and logging by the campaign. Having articulated the sources of delay,
it is clear that the delay is going to be highly heterogeneous across obser-
vations. As a result, some of the contributions recorded for date t are the
result of date t campaign conditions while some are the result of yesterday’s
conditions and some are the result of last week’s conditions. In a manner of
speaking, the dependent variable mixes several contribution vintages all of
which must be regressed on the same political conditions. This could possibly
lead to misspecification as one cannot separate the vintages and separately
regress them each on the proper lag of campaign conditions. One potential
solution is to simply include several lags of the political conditions and allow
each lag to pick up one of the vintages. However, because political conditions,
as measured by IEM prices, are a random walk and thus highly persistent,
this leads to severe multicollinearity. Luckily, however, we are rescued by
this very persistence! Because the IEM price is a random walk, the difference
in IEM price between any two dates is white noise error. Thus matching a
particular vintage of contributions to political conditions that are too recent
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simply induces white noise error in the independent variable. To avoid the
resulting attenuation bias, we include lagged differences in the IEM.
More formally, suppose the true model includes heterogeneous delay such
that a day’s recorded contributions are the result of K lags of political
conditions where ψk indicates how strongly contributions of delay k respond
to political conditions.
Ct =
K∑
k=1
ψkPt−k + εt
Pt = Pt−1 + ηt
Substituting recursively allows us to rewrite contributions:
Ct =
(
K∑
k=1
ψk
)
Pt−1 +
[
εt −
K∑
k=1
ψk
(
k−1∑
l=1
ηt−l
)]
(2)
Since the error terms, η and ε are both mean zero normal, the term in
brackets is also mean zero normal but it is now correlated with the dependent
variable, Pt−1 through previous shocks to the IEM, η. Thus we must include
K lags of η, the change in the IEM price, in the regression.19 Then, regressing
contributions on a single lag of IEM price plus the K lagged changes in IEM
price
Ct = βPt−1 +
K∑
k=1
αkηt−k + εt
⇒ βˆ =
K∑
k=1
ψk
yields an unbiased coefficient estimate equal to the sum of the partial effects
at all lags. In sum, we can safely lump all vintages together and regress on
a single lag of IEM price because that IEM price is a good proxy for the
political conditions prevailing when the decision to contribute was made,
whenever that was.
The identification of the model rests on an assumption about the timing
of contributions. There are many steps that must take place before an unex-
pected increase in contributions can affect the candidate’s perceived chance
19 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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of victory. First, the check must be recorded and vetted before the funds
are transferred to the campaign. Next the campaign manager must update
budget decisions in response to the extra money. Once the money has been
allocated to a particular expenditure, a contractor must be found and the
money spent on additional mailings or advertising. And finally, these activ-
ities must have their effect on the audience and this effect must be noted
by the IEM participants. Our identification rests on the notion that this
transmission process takes longer than the longest lag, K; thus innovations
in campaign contributions do not cause changes in IEM price within the
same week.20 Using the implied exclusion restriction, the ARIMA model of
Equation (1) is valid and the estimated relationships may be interpreted as
causal. This identification strategy is one major advantage of using high-
frequency longitudinal data.
The results from the pooled regressions are presented in Table 2. We can-
not control for the general election prospects for the democratic nomina-
tion of 2004 because the relevant IEM market was not initiated until rela-
tively late in the invisible primary. Thus, in columns (1) and (2), we present
results both with and without this control. First, the estimated elasticity of
fundraising with respect to IEM price, 0.36, is moderately large and highly
significant. Thus a doubling of a candidate’s IEM price would lead to a 36%
increase in fund-raising. It is worth noting that a positive coefficient can be
generated either by a candidate on the way up enjoying increases in both
perceived chance of victory and fundraising, or by a candidate on the way
down, seeing his or her prospects diminish resulting in withered fundraising.
Indeed, some candidates, such as Howard Dean in 2004, traverse the path in
both directions. Second, the estimated autoregressive coefficient, 0.22, is also
highly significant and moderately large. Thus the total cumulative impact
on contributions from a single innovation to probability of victory, given by
β1/(1-ϕ1), is roughly 128% of the initial impact.
20 One might wonder why campaigns do not simply release the information immediately, hoping
to generate hype. In fact, this does happen, but only very rarely for unusually large single
day totals. On November 5, 2007, Republican candidate Ron Paul released a press statement
claiming to have raised more than $2.7 million over the past 24 hours via online donations,
setting the single day record. As it turns out, it was not until the next day that the campaign
completed and reported its final tally which turned out to be over 50% larger than originally
estimated. This example shows that even a moment specifically designed as a media coup, with
donations collected online to facilitate counting, required overnight counting and a 50% revision
of the initial estimate. This suggests that keeping a real-time running total of expenditures is
probably not an efficient use of scarce staffer time.
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Table 2. The elasticity of fundraising with respect to perceived viability.
(1) (2) (3)
Lag of log(contributions), [φ1] 0.220 0.203 0.191
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025)
Lag of Log(IEM price), [β1] 0.358 0.380 0.023
(0.063) (0.069) (0.162)
Lag of Log(IEM price) squared 0.087
(0.031)
Lag of Log(General Election
IEM price), [β2]
0.953 1.740
(0.901) (0.954)
Days until the convention, [β3] −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Obs. 6449 5140 4678
Candidates 26 20 18
Within-candidate R-squared 0.446 0.465 0.453
All specifications include fixed-effects for each candidate, day of the week, and week of
the quarter. Specification (3) does not include the candidates classified as wire-to-wire
front-runners (Gore00, Bush00)
Figures 2 and 3 present the results from the candidate-by-candidate regres-
sions.21 For Figure 2, the y-axis plots the estimated elasticity of fund-raising
with respect to IEM price; the x-axis plots the midpoint of the candidate’s
range of IEM scores during the competitive part of the primary. For exam-
ple, in 2000 George Bush’s IEM score ranged from a low of 65 to a high
21 Estimating independent equations for each candidate may seem to rule out competition
between candidates for funds. First, the fundraising literature emphasizes that campaigns do
not compete heavily for the same pool of donors, but rather establish their own base and try
to milk it. Second, the evidence shows that the largest campaign donors — who might be
identified and sought by multiple campaigns due to past support of the party — very often
support multiple candidates. Thus we believe such competition is of second order to mobiliza-
tion of one’s own list. Moreover, because the probability of victory must sum to one over all
candidates in an efficient prediction market, any improvement of a rival’s prospects will be
taken into account via the consequent fall in a candidate’s own probability of victory. Thus,
what fundraising competition does exist is accounted for indirectly in specification (1) despite
running the candidates separately.
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Figure 2. Elasticity of fund-raising with respect to IEM price.
of 91.5 yielding a midpoint of 78.25. The purpose is to demonstrate hetero-
geneity in the marginal effect of viability. While Bush00, and Gore00 are
outliers, the remainder of the sample exhibits a strong pattern: the elasticity
increases as the candidate’s IEM midpoint increases. Bush00 and Gore00
are the two campaigns in our sample who were wire-to-wire front-runners
in the IEM. They are thus the two candidates whose viability was never in
doubt. But for candidates whose viability is in doubt, the pattern suggests
that the elasticity of fundraising is an increasing function of viability. Thus
we have rerun the pooled regression with a quadratic term restricting the
sample by dropping the two outliers (Table 2, column 3). The quadratic term
is highly significant, confirming that the candidate-by-candidate results of
Figure 2 are replicated in the pooled sample. Finally, we can see with the
corrected specification that a candidate’s fundraising responds strongly to
changes in their party’s prospects for the general election. While the esti-
mated elasticity, at 1.74, is quite large, it is important to remember that
changes in the probability of the general election are generally modest in
scope.
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Figure 3. Candidate fundraising abilities.
These are the candidate fixed-effects from Table 2, Specification 1. These are best inter-
preted as the relative fundraising ability of the candidates after controlling for perceived
viability.
Figure 3 plots the fixed-effect from the candidate regressions on the
y-axis. These fixed-effects can be roughly interpreted as the candidates’
comparative ability to raise money keeping perceived viability and time-to-
convention fixed. The x-axis groups the regressions by primary to enable
comparisons across candidates within the same contest. As can be seen,
more recent primaries draw more money, thus all candidates enjoy larger
fixed-effects. Notice that winners tend to be strong fundraisers, even after
controlling for perceived viability. Al Gore is the only primary winner that
did not have the highest fixed-effect (or very nearly so for Bob Dole) of the
competitors in the primary.
We have established that for challengers, fundraising is strongly respon-
sive to perceived viability and that this elasticity is increasing in viability.
What causes this nonlinear relationship? Brown et al. (1995) note that
‘‘[c]ontributors and solicitors who are not strongly committed to a candidate
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may disappear if the candidacy falters and the prospects for election
diminish.’’ In general, the literature on contributors (and the solicitors who
deliver them) suggests that a campaign possesses an island of strongly com-
mitted backers that will ride through thick and thin amidst a sea of strategic
money that is attracted by the prospect of electoral success. Our results
fit with this characterization. The viability of the front-runners has already
been demonstrated; hence the variations in IEM price are generally swamped
by other factors in the contributor’s calculus. As a result, front-runners’
contributions are largely invariant to fluctuations in IEM price and, to the
extent there is some response, it may even be negative as money flows faster
when the campaign loses ground to a potential challenger and needs assis-
tance.22 Not so for lesser challengers, who must demonstrate their viability
to potential supporters. Why then does the elasticity increase with the IEM
price? The longest of long-shots cannot generate sufficient prospects to begin
to attract the tide of strategic money and thus, fluctuations in their slim
perceived chance of victory mean little for their fundraising yields. However,
as candidates demonstrate increasing viability, increases may plausibly be
sold to potential contributors as evidence of a run to prominence.
5 Candidate Appearances
As a second analysis of fundraising, we study the effects of candidate appear-
ances on statewide fundraising. We ask whether perceived chance of victory
increases the fund-raising productivity of candidate appearances. Looking
at a cross-section of state-level data constitutes a new cut of the data which
corroborates our longitudinal results.
In order to raise money, ‘‘candidates must assemble a set of benefits
that will attract enough contributors to fund the campaign . . . [and] build
an organization to distribute these benefits and attract members.’’ (Brown
22 In a related analysis, we look at the effect of announcements by two prominent potential
candidates waiting in the wings during the primary season: General Colin Powell in 1996 and
Hillary Clinton in 2004. To the extent that these constitute large shocks to the perceived
chances of the current field of candidates which are not already captured by fluctuations in
the IEM, we would expect to find some effect on fundraising. Using interrupted time-series
techniques, we find that the elimination of rivals who have already been shown to be lesser
(Clinton was trailing in the polls in 2004) makes little difference to the fund-raising process of
front-runners, but a legitimate challenge to their status as front-runners (Powell in 1996) can
make a very large difference. See Feigenbaum and Shelton (2009).
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et al. 1995) One of the most important, and most limited, benefits to be
distributed is access to the candidate himself or herself. We have argued
in the preceding sections that there exists a positive effect of viability on
fund-raising and we have shown that, for many candidates, aggregate contri-
butions increase with perceived chance of victory. If candidate appearances
serve as a quid pro quo, providing immediate social returns in exchange for
contributions, then it seems likely that the more popular the candidate, the
greater the demand for his or her presence and the greater the contributions
such an appearance would solicit. This kind of exchange is a local one: the
contributors involved are physically present at the candidate’s event or con-
nected via local news and personal networks. As a result, were we able to
track a candidate’s appearances, we would expect to see increased contribu-
tions in the vicinity.
With this test in mind, we return to the FEC dataset and generate the
total contributions in a given week for a given candidate in a given state.
We then use the Washington Post dataset on candidate appearances in the
2008 primaries, described in the section on candidate appearances, to cre-
ate a dummy variable indicating whether a given candidate has made an
appearance in a given state in a given week. Thus we have a panel dataset,
with weekly data by candidate–state pair, describing total funds raised and
whether a candidate appearance was made. To this we add the IEM market
data measuring the candidate’s perceived chance of victory during the week
in question.
We perform a simple panel regression looking for the contemporaneous
effect on state-wide fundraising of a candidate appearance within the same
state. Our specification is
Cc,s,w = ϕ1
13∑
j=1
Cc,s,w−j + β1Vc,w + β2Ac,s,w + β3(Vc,w × Ac,s,w)
+β4Pc,w + β5Dc,w + β6(Vc,w − Vc,w−1) + Fc + εc,s,w (3)
where Cc,s,w is total contributions from individuals to candidate c in state s
in week w, Vc,w is the probability of victory, Pc,w is the measure of the popu-
larity of the candidate’s party, Dw is the number of days until the candidate’s
convention, and Fc are candidate fixed-effects. We include a full quarter’s
worth of weekly lags of the dependent variable to control for the fact that
candidates might choose the location of their appearances in response to
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previous fundraising successes and failures.23 And we include the change in
the IEM to address the measurement lag in contributions discussed in the
previous section. Total contributions for a candidate in a state are quite
often zero, especially for lesser candidates, smaller states, and earlier in the
campaign. This is analogous to left-censoring of the observed supply of con-
tributions, thus we estimate the model via panel Tobit.24 The coefficient
of particular interest here is β3, which indicates whether the candidate’s
current political fortunes (Vc,w) affect the fundraising productivity of can-
didate appearances (Ac,s,w). But we will also look at β1, β2, β4, and β5 to
corroborate results from ‘‘The battle for the bucks’’ section.
This approach contains at least three important simplifications. First, we
have chosen to aggregate contributions and events to the state level rather
than county, zip code, or some other geographic partition. Making such a
choice requires taking a stance on the geographic scope of the fund-raising
benefits of an appearance. Both attendance — leading to priming and direct
solicitation — and local media coverage — leading to priming for other
forms of solicitation — likely reach a wider audience than the immediate
zip code. One also suspects that there are unannounced fund-raisers in the
evenings after the events in the database. These need not be in the same zip
code but are likely in the same state. Of course, while picking up a larger
fraction of the signal, aggregating at the state level rather than the zip code
is also likely to pick up more noise in the form of unrelated fluctuations
in contributions. We believe the state is the proper level of aggregation to
maximize the signal to noise ratio.25 We have also chosen to look only for
same-week effects, rather than allowing events to affect local fundraising for
23 Adding additional lags all the way through 16 weeks improves the Akaike information criterion
suggesting improved fit of the model. However, a close examination of the coefficients suggests
that lags beyond one quarter are contaminated by seasonal patterns. As the gains to the AIC
are marginal beyond the 13th lag, we choose to keep only 13.
24 This also means we cannot use the log transformation so coefficients are no longer elasticities.
25 We have also tried aggregating by three-digit zip code. Zip codes follow a simple pattern. The
first digit represents a group of states (for example, a leading four signals the state is either
Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, or Kentucky). The next two digits are the region within that state
group, usually centered on a major city (for example, 432xx is a zip code centered on the
postal hub of Columbus, OH). These three-digit zip codes represent US Postal Service sectional
center facilities. (The final two digits identify cities and towns individually.) Hence the three-
digit zip code represents a sizable, contiguous, geographic area including several towns which
is nonetheless significantly smaller than the state. However, densely populated metropolitan
areas such as New York City often have several three-digit zip codes within close proximity.
It is quite likely that an event listed in one zip3 would draw contributions from neighboring
zip3s. Indeed, the empirical results do not display a strong pattern.
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several weeks in the future.26 In light of a complete lack of theoretical priors
for what such a time-path should look like, we felt such an exercise would
constitute little more than data mining. The current approach is thus likely
an underestimate of the total local effect of candidate appearances. Iowa
and New Hampshire, as the sites of the first Caucus and Primary, receive a
disproportionate number of candidate appearances. Because visits are likely
subject to diminishing returns and because candidates visiting these states
likely conduct their business with a different set of goals (free press rather
than fundraising), we drop these two states from the regression. Finally, with
the results from ‘‘The battle for the bucks’’ section in mind, we have also run
the sample allowing IEM price to have a quadratic effect on contributions.
The results for both specifications are reported in Table 3. The estimates
reiterate the results from ‘‘The battle for the bucks’’ section: a candidate’s
fund-raising responds strongly to his/her perceived chance of victory. To
this we can now add that a candidate appearance raises more contributions
when the candidate’s perceived chance of victory is high. This holds for both
the front-runner and the rest of the pack. These results suggest that elec-
toral success increases the productivity of the scarcest campaign resource:
candidate time. Most importantly, the results confirm that bandwagoning
by contributors eager to associate with a winning campaign is a plausible
driver of the link between viability and fundraising.
6 Productivity of Campaign Expenditures
6.1 The Direct Effect
‘‘The battle for the bucks’’ and ‘‘Candidate appearances’’ sections have
documented the effects of electoral success on the ability of candidates to
raise money. We have both confirmed the initial hypothesis that perceived
viability helps raise money and established that this relationship is increas-
ingly powerful as the candidate increases in status. It is time to turn to the
other half of the positive feedback loop: the effects of campaign expendi-
tures on electoral success, both perceived and actual. During the campaign,
a candidate spends money to pay for campaigning trips — speeches and
appearances that generate support both directly and indirectly via free
26 Unfortunately, at our preferred daily frequency, events are sufficiently rare within the vast
{candidate} × {day} × {state} space that several of our independent variables are collinear
with the fixed-effects. Thus we must aggregate to weekly data.
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Table 3. Candidate appearances and fundraising.
Linear Quadratic
(1) (2)
Probability of victory, β1 518.130 429.072
(58.669) (141.492)
Probability of victory squared 1.335
(2.033)
Dummy(appearance), β2 332.877 291.295
(4141.604) (4139.412)
Prob. of victory * dummy (appearance), β3 952.485 958.320
(111.114) (111.082)
Own party prob. of national victory, β4 18937.990 9581.846
(22171.040) (22418.290)
Days to convention, β5 −177.732 −170.190
(8.435) (9.034)
Obs. 8389 8389
Obs., uncensored 6736 6736
χ2 statistic 7043.799 7058.659
prob (> χ2) 0 0
Dependent variable is contributions to the candidate from a particular state in a particular
week. Estimated using panel tobit. Specification includes one financial quarter’s worth of
lags of the dependent variable and candidate fixed-effects.
media — and to pay for advertising in a variety of media outlets such as TV,
internet, radio, and direct mail. In order for the feedback loop to present a
true chicken-and-egg problem, it must be the case that this spending can
raise a candidate’s stature during the campaign itself, sufficiently swiftly for
this increased stature to then empower future fundraising, as per the results
of previous sections. Without a sufficiently swift reaction, the positive feed-
back would have insufficient time to develop and would not deliver as strong
a barrier to the initial long-shots.
Consider a model in which the probability of victory for candidate c at
time t, Vc,t, depends on the spending in the previous period by the candidate,
Ec,t−1, spending by his or her opponents, Eˆc,t−1, the quality of the candidate,
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Qc, the quality of his or her opponents, Qˆc, and a public preference for
candidate c, ac, which is a function of the set of candidates but is imperfectly
observed, such as preference based on policy position.
Vc,t = β1Ec,t−1 + β2Eˆc,t−1 + γ1E2c,t−1 + γ2Eˆ
2
c,t−1
+ δ1Qc + δ1Qˆc + ac + uc,t
With panel data, one can simply roll the unobserved candidate-specific
terms into candidate fixed-effects. To the extent that candidate quality is
fixed, then estimates of the effect of campaign spending on vote share will
be unbiased.27
Vc,t = β1Ec,t−1 + β2Eˆc,t−1 + γ1E2c,t−1 + γ2Eˆ
2
c,t−1 + νc + uc,t (4)
We estimate Equation (4) using quarterly data for expenditures and
the beginning-of-quarter IEM price to calculate Ec,t−1 and Vc,t.28 Average
expenditures per candidate by quarter increase over the course of the cam-
paign and then fall off in the final quarter because many campaigns end
during the second quarter of the year of the general election. We also sus-
pect that during the primary season itself (the first two quarters of the
year of the general election) the relationship between expenditures and IEM
price is affected by voting results and thus likely to be different than the
relationship of the preceding year. To avoid erroneously estimating one rela-
tionship for two distinct periods, we limit our sample to the year prior to the
election.29
Much of the effort in the invisible primary is directed at influencing
activists and journalists, recruiting skilled campaign workers, setting up
local campaigning offices, and eliciting endorsements. While many of these
activities are unlikely to show up in the polls until much later, there is
27 We consider candidate quality to encompass the candidate’s prior experience in public office,
ability as a public speaker, and relative ideological position, among other qualities. While prior
record can be spun it cannot be altered. Candidates can and do adjust their issue positions
but rarely change relative positions. And while candidates learn, it is clear that idiosyncratic
weaknesses are difficult to erase, often resurfacing repeatedly. In sum, we believe these fixed-
effects are relatively fixed and that we can successfully demean the probability of victory model
given above.
28 Hence expenditures in the fourth quarter of 1999 are matched to IEM price on Jan 1, 2000.
29 As it turns out, adding the primary season itself does not change the sign and significance of the
coefficients. Nonetheless, given the complexities of the actual primary and the commensurate
likelihood of a change in specification, we feel this is the proper approach.
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strong evidence that IEM traders do pay attention to endorsements and
early pieces of journalism including those in specialty outlets. For example,
Howard Dean’s price jumped 9 cents in a single day in December 2003 on
early news reports that he was to receive Al Gore’s endorsement the following
day. The end of day price following the actual announcement was only 1 cent
higher, suggesting that 90 percent of the IEM response occurred before the
endorsement was formally announced. In short, campaign efforts during the
invisible primary lead to results which move the IEM. While we are unable
to disentangle exactly how expenditures lead to increased viability, we can
measure the net effects.
The results, presented in column 1 of Table 4 show a strong and signifi-
cant effect of campaign spending on market estimates of the probability of
victory. Spending an additional $1 million (real 2000 dollars) increases the
IEM probability of victory by as much as 1.75 percentage points. However,
an additional $1 million in expenditures by one’s opponents reduces one’s
probability of nomination by as much as 1 percentage point. As expected,
spending by any candidate exhibits decreasing returns to scale. On the one
hand, this confirms the other half of the feedback loop. On the other hand,
it is worth noting that candidate fixed-effects are estimated to explain 86%
of the variation in the probability of victory measure (see ρ). In other words,
recent campaign spending is an important factor in determining a candi-
date’s perceived viability, but other factors such as policy positions, cam-
paigning ability, and endorsements are likely even more important.
Because the IEM is a forward looking asset market, we would expect
traders to take into account not only current spending, but also expected
future spending as measured by cash-on-hand. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4
include cash-on-hand in linear and then quadratic form. While the standard
errors are quite large, the signs are as expected. The magnitude of the coef-
ficients on own expenditure and own cash-on-hand sum to 1.82 (column 2),
which is very similar to the original coefficient on own total expenditure.
This implies that the original specification was picking up the effects of both
current and future expenditures. The effect of current expenditures is closer
to 1.15 IEM points per million dollars.
6.2 Voting with Money: Signaling via Fundraising News
There is an alternate view of the role of money which deserves mention. In
accord with Prat (2002), many believe campaign contributions are signals
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Table 4. Quarterly expenditures and IEM price.
IEM price (V)
(1) (2) (3)
Own total exp, E 1.752 1.147 1.091
(0.746) (0.689) (0.647)
Own total exp2, E2 −0.024 −0.010 −0.008
(0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Opponents’ total exp, Eˆ −1.030 −0.680 −0.857
(0.307) (0.314) (0.276)
Opponents’ total exp2, Eˆ2 0.011 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Own cash-on-hand, C 0.675 0.749
(0.588) (0.825)
Own cash-on-hand2, C2 −0.002
(0.016)
Opponents’ total cash-on-hand, Cˆ −0.318 −0.846
(0.291) (0.438)
Opponents’ total cash-on-hand2, Cˆ2 0.008
(0.004)
N 73 73 73
Candidates 23 23 23
ρ 0.863 0.781 0.778
R2 (within) 0.255 0.311 0.362
R2 (overall) 0.378 0.673 0.678
R2 (between) 0.41 0.696 0.686
Expenditures data are in millions of real 2000 dollars. IEM price data are in percentage
points.
of the candidate’s quality. Essentially, each voter possesses noisy private
information about candidate quality and gives money to the candidate
his/her private information suggests is the best. Thus there is a positive
relationship between the true quality of the candidate and the amount of
contributions he/she is able to rake in, allowing a voter to improve his/her
private signal of a candidate’s quality simply by noting how much money
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he/she has raised, thereby internalizing the private information of others.
In this view, campaign expenditures may or may not also directly influence
voters via paid advertising and candidate appearances. Fundraising is thus
a sort of continuous straw poll in which monetary votes are publicly counted
and may influence the views of other voters going forward.
Given the level of press coverage devoted to quarterly FEC fundraising
totals, and the success of signaling models and the informational properties
of voting in other contexts, this is an intuitively plausible and appealing
model that deserves attention. To test it, we have run an interrupted event
study using the FEC reports in which candidates’ quarterly or monthly
fundraising totals are released. We begin by building an ARIMA model
for the IEM markets for each candidate. Then we use intervention analysis
to estimate the magnitude of the initial impact and the rate of exponen-
tial decay of the news from FEC reports. To limit to the period of most
intense media scrutiny, we use the releases for the third and fourth quarter
of the year before and the first monthly release for the year of the general
election.30
The overwhelming pattern in the data is the insignificance of fundraising
news releases on the IEM probability of nomination for all candidates in
the sample. Of the 45 candidate–release pairs in our sample, only five are
significant at the 10% level. This is no different from the results of a random
sample. Moreover, the pattern of signs among these significant coefficients
does not seem to match the tenor of the press coverage following the release.
For example, in December of 2003, Dean reported $16 million in fourth
quarter contributions bringing his total to $40.9 million. While both of these
marks led the field, the estimated impact of this FEC report was a five
point decline in his/her probability of victory.31 We submit that the results
are simply random noise with no evidence of a systematically significant
effect.
These results are surprising given that Table 3 clearly showed that cash-
on-hand, a measure of expected future spending, was related to current
IEM price. Since fundraising is also a measure of expected future spending,
we would have expected a connection between fundraising news and IEM
price. We suspect this discrepancy has more to do with the dating of the
30 Recall that FEC reports are filed quarterly the year before and monthly the year of the general
election.
31 This result is not driven by Dean’ s later failure in the Iowa caucus.
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information than its interpretation by the market. Quarterly reports are due
exactly 10 days after the end of the quarter and the information is released
exactly 5 days after that. Nonetheless, it is quite plausible that the official
FEC release date is not, in fact, the actual date at which the information is
released to the public or the IEM participants. Many campaigns release their
numbers (or hint at them) to the media before the FEC announcements. In
an attempt to address early information leaks, we have done media searches
to identify the date of first mention and have used this instead of the offi-
cial release date. The results remain insignificant. Admittedly, we have no
guarantees that we have successfully identified the actual date the infor-
mation first became public. It is possible that insiders leak the knowledge
before mention in the press. Nonetheless, while not completely disproving
the money-as-signal theory, our evidence suggests that at the very least, the
diffusion of that information is very gradual.
7 Simulations
In the preceding sections, we have argued that there is a robust significant
positive feedback loop between contributions and perceived chance of vic-
tory. Ultimately, we are interested in whether this feedback loop is strong
enough to significantly alter the dynamics of a campaign. In particular, we
ask two questions. First, we ask how important it is to be anointed the
initial front-runner and whether this anointing can, because of the positive
feedback loop, be self-sustaining. Second, we ask whether a wealthy candi-
date can, via profligate self-financing, emerge from the pack to challenge an
established front-runner. To answer these questions, we have conducted a
pair of calibrated simulations.
We use the coefficients presented in Tables 2 and 4 to simulate the paths
of contributions, spending, and perceived chance of victory for a set of can-
didates in response to a pre-determined shock.32 The setting is stochastic —
in addition to the specified shock of interest, there are random weekly shocks
to perceived chance of victory — thus we run the simulation 5000 times,
32 There are two important respects in which the estimates from “The battle for the bucks” and
“Productivity of campaign expenditures” sections differ. First, the former are elasticities while
the latter are in levels. This requires no special assumptions, merely a transformation of units.
Second, the former are daily while the latter are quarterly. Thus we assume that IEM price
responds to the quarterly equivalent of current daily spending.
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generating a distribution of paths. We then report the mean path plus upper
and lower bounds at +/− two standard errors. In addition to the behavior
of contributions and the effectiveness of spending, we have calibrated sev-
eral other important parameters — initial levels of spending, initial levels
of perceived chance of victory, and the standard deviation of the shocks to
perceived chance of victory — using the data from an actual primary which
mimics the scenario in question.
In the first case, we postulate two identical candidates and calibrate their
fundraising abilities to the Gore–Bradley race of 2000.33 We then arbitrarily
designate one of the two identical candidates the front-runner, give him a
67–33 advantage in the IEM markets, and simulate the path of contributions
and IEM price in response to this symmetry-breaking. The resulting paths
are displayed in Figure 4. We have chosen to show only the path of the
front-runner because the path of the challenger is precisely a mirror image
for IEM price and very nearly so for contributions.
We find that the arbitrarily assigned front-runner advantage is not self-
sustaining. The advantage in stature does lead to a sizable advantage in
fundraising for the front-runner, which, due to the autoregressive nature of
contributions, takes a few days to build to its zenith. Nonetheless, because
the effects of additional spending are, while robustly positive, relatively
weak, the resulting spending gap is not sufficient to sustain the gap in IEM
prices which produced it. As a result, the unearned and unwarranted front-
runner advantage gradually bleeds away. Seven months later — the period
of time between the opening of the IEM in Jun 1999 and the first primaries
in Jan 2000 — the advantage is a mere 52–48.
This is an important result because it suggests that the vicious cycle is
not strong enough by itself to enforce and make permanent an advantage
gained by (possibly spurious) initial impressions. In a sense, a candidate
must also earn the front-runner status in other ways — such as by being the
better candidate and thus receiving greater support from a given amount of
spending — in order to retain it.
Our second exercise simulates the advantages of an exogenous increase in
campaign funding as a result of self-financing by a wealthy candidate. Here
33 Daily contributions for each candidate are set to $47,000 when the IEM is at 50–50 (an average
of the two candidates’ actual weekly fundraising during the money primary). The standard
deviation of shocks to the IEM price is calibrated to match the Gore–Bradley money primary
as well.
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Figure 4. How durable is front-runner advantage?
One of two identical candidates is gifted an initial advantage of 67–33 on the IEM. In the
upper graph, the solid line displays the simulated evolution of the IEM price of the front-
runner over the subsequent year. The dotted lines demark a confidence interval of two
standard deviations on either side. The lower graph shows the evolution of contributions
for the front-runner. The initial advantage in stature conveys a significant advantage in
fundraising but because the productivity of spending is relatively low, this advantage in
fundraising is insufficient to maintain the advantage in IEM price. Thus, the vicious cycle
cannot, on its own, sustain a front-runner: there must be some difference between the
candidates.
we calibrate the scenario to the Republican primary of 1996. Steve Forbes’
formally entered the race on September 22, 1995, 143 days before the Iowa
caucus. During his campaign he spent $37.9 million of his personal fortune,
more than 13 times the private contributions he raised. Given Forbes’ date
of entry, we calibrate to 1995q4, when the race had essentially settled into a
front-runner (Dole) and three challengers (Gramm, Alexander, Buchanan)
plus the self-financed Forbes.34 We model campaign contributions and IEM
34 We take our starting values for the IEM as the normalized IEM prices of the candidates dur-
ing this period, rounded to nice numbers. We calibrate initial candidate contributions as the
average value of each candidate’s private fourth quarter contributions data. We deliberately
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Figure 5. Can a self-financed candidate emerge from the pack?
A candidate self-finances to the tune of 12 times their external contributions in an attempt
to emerge from the pack and challenge the established front-runner. The slight hitch at
period 128 is due to the challengers dropping out of the race as their IEM price drops
below 1 cent.
price as before, but now allow the self-financed candidate to spend in excess
of elicited contributions. The results are displayed in Figure 5.35
Our simulation produces dynamics that are similar to the actual invisible
primary of 1996. During the invisible primary, Forbes’ spending did enable
him to emerge from the pack. By February 2, 1996, 133 days after entering
the race, Forbes’ IEM contract was trading at 21.5 cents, overshadowing
Gramm (11.9), Alexander (5.4) and Buchanan (5.1). On the eve of the cau-
cuses, this was Forbes’ high-water mark. His contract would decline following
simulate three identical challengers so as to focus on the dynamics of the self-funded candi-
date. Thus we use averages from the three actual challengers — Gramm, Alexander, and
Buchanan — to calibrate the generic challenger. The self-financed candidate’s extra expendi-
ture is also calibrated to the average daily amount Forbes spent in 1995q4.
35 Standard errors have been suppressed for legibility. The existence of a local minimum causes
estimated contributions to escalate rapidly as IEM price approaches zero. Thus to avoid this
unrealistic response, we assume candidates drop out once their IEM price drops below 1%.
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the Louisiana (Feb 6) and Iowa (Feb 12) caucuses as it became clear that
voter support remained tepid despite his profligacy.
Our simulation, drawing on coefficients estimated from a pooled sample,
suggests such dynamics are to be expected more generally. Specifically,
4 months of exceptionally high spending by a marginal candidate can enable
that candidate to emerge from the pack as the sole challenger to the estab-
lished front-runner. However, in our simulations, the self-financed candidate
is unable to catch the front-runner (Figure 5 shows the mean result; in none
of the 500 repetitions did the self-financed candidate catch the front-runner).
Forbes entered the race quite late. But our simulation shows that even had
he entered the race at the beginning, spending alone would not have over-
come whatever flaws he had as a candidate. We find that, even after an
entire year of such exceptionally high spending, the self-financed candidate’s
simulated IEM price is 34 cents and stable. Thus, here too we find that while
money is a significant aspect of the invisible primary, it does not dominate
candidate selection.
8 Summary and Discussion
Using longitudinal and panel methods on a consistent set of US presidential
primaries, we have shown that both sides of the vicious cycle are statistically
significant. A candidate’s fundraising responds strongly and significantly to
the candidate’s perceived chance of winning the nomination (‘‘The battle for
the bucks’’ section). Moreover candidate appearances are more productive
in fundraising when the candidate is popular (‘‘Candidate appearances’’
section). This gives direct evidence in favor of the specific mechanism at
work — that increases in perceived electoral viability mean increased asso-
ciative benefits stimulating increased contributions — and serve to con-
firm the results of the dynamic analysis with a cross-sectional approach.
Finally, we take the first look at the dynamic feedback from expenditures
to viability during the campaign and find strong and significant evidence
that money increases the perceived chance of victory of those that spend
it, to the detriment of rivals (‘‘Productivity of campaign expenditures’’
section).
Nonetheless, despite positive and significant feedback in both direc-
tions, the ‘‘Simulations’’ section shows that the vicious cycle is not suffi-
ciently strong to explain, by itself, a durable front-runner advantage. The
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fundraising advantage conferred on a candidate anointed the ex-ante front-
runner is real, but the increased spending enabled is insufficiently productive
to sustain the front-runner status by itself. To sustain a lead, the front-
runner must possess some other advantage over his/her rival beyond the
initial anointing. The fact that we observe front-runner advantage to be
durable in our sample suggests that either the process by which the initial
front-runner is identified correctly processes information about the quality
of the candidates, or there are other elements to the feedback loop that
reinforce front-runner status. For similar reasons, exorbitant spending by
self-financed candidates may enable them to emerge from the pack but will
not, by itself, deliver the nomination. Thus Aldrich’s vicious cycle exists but
is too weak to determine the nomination by itself.
Cohen et al. (2008) suggest looking first at whether party insiders can
co-ordinate on a candidate that is acceptable to all factions and has a good
chance of victory, as evidenced by formal endorsements from party elites
and interest groups. If they can, money and voters will follow. But in their
quantitative work, they find that ‘‘fundraising is neither clearly caused by
other variables in the invisible primary nor a clear cause of other variables.’’
(Cohen et al. p. 264) Our high-frequency analysis finds quite the opposite:
money is strongly connected with our aggregate measure of perceived viabil-
ity with statistically significant causality running in both directions. How-
ever, we do concur with their verbal argument in as much as money is more
a symptom than a cause of success. Nonetheless, money does matter during
the invisible primary and nontrivially so. We find that 22% of variation in
the IEM is explained by variation in spending and cash-on-hand. It sim-
ply is not solely decisive. At present, we do not know which factors — free
media, insider endorsements, policy positions, skilled campaign staff, debate
performance, candidate charisma — are most important in accounting for
the remaining fluctuations in perceived viability. The Iowa Electronic Mar-
kets price remains an aggregate indicator in need of decomposition. Thus
we are presently unable to comment further on the central hypothesis in
Cohen et al.: that party insiders control the nomination and money and
voters follow. Further work is needed.
Hence the need for high-frequency data on a number of other dimensions
during the invisible primary such as free and paid media, personal and inter-
est group endorsements, and the recruitment of skilled campaign staff. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Citizen’s United vs. FEC and the
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resulting tidal wave of poorly tracked money directed by quasi-independent
super PACs has made this job both more complex and of greater interest.
Extending high-frequency methods to down-ticket races may be hampered
by the thinness of the prediction markets covering these races but is also
worth exploring.
We believe this paper shows the usefulness of high-frequency data analysis
to untangle the feedback between various indicators of campaign success.
The past two decades have seen many innovations facilitating the collec-
tion of high-frequency electoral data, among them online electronic access to
FEC data, the development and proliferation of political prediction markets,
the increasing compilation of repeated public opinion polls, the availabil-
ity of candidates’ calendars, and the recording and analysis of campaign
advertising. We anticipate the gathering of systematic, high-frequency elec-
toral data will continue to expand, enabling broader application of these
methods.
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